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BOOK REVIEWS
Labor-Management Relations
Labor and the Economy. By Gary A. Moore
and Randyl D. Elkin. Cincinnati, Ohio:
South-Western Publishing, 1983. viii, 502
pp. N.p.
If academics agreed about what constituted a
perfect textbook, there would be many fewer
texts in the market. As it is, the textbook market
for introductory labor relations and labor
economics textbooks is glutted with books that
fit many differing definitions of the perfect text.
Moore and Elkin's adds another to this collec-
tion.
Moore and Elkin believe that current texts are
either too institutional, too theoretical, or too
long. Their professed ambition in writing this
one was to produce a concise volume that
appropriately combined the theoretical and the
institutional perspectives. If brevity is honor-
able, their 502-page text ranks among the
thinnest introductory labor relations texts on
my heavily burdened shelves.
At what cost brevity? The text manages to
give only 35 lines of type to unfair practices of
management and labor. It omits much of the
often violent conflict that shaped our industrial
relations system. In only one case (their mention
of H. Greg Lewis's study of the union wage
impact) do the authors report specific empirical
evidence, settling elsewhere to give broad
generalizations about empirical findings. The
text spends very little time relating existing
institutional arrangements to either economic
theory or labor relations theory. A text with
these failings is too brief to be pedagogically
useful.
The collective bargaining section of this book
is its best. Students will leave its pages with a
working knowledge of the mechanics of labor-
management relations. They will appreciate
the role of the strike in those relations, the skills
required of bargainers, the day-to-day process
of contract interpretation, and the role unions
play in today's society.
Students will not, however, take from the
collective bargaining section any substantial
knowledge of unfair labor practices. As an
example, the entire discussion of section 8(a) (3)
of the National Labor Relations Act is the terse:
"it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
• . . discriminate against an employee on the
basis of union membership (union security
clauses are an exception)." The knowledge
imparted by those words is useless to a student.
Unfair labor practices are the framework
around which labor-management relations
have been draped since the Act's passage in
1935, and a survey textbook in labor-
management relations that passes them over is
surely incomplete.
A collective bargaining simulation is in-
cluded as an appendix. If brevity is a goal to be
sought, one wonders whether a simulation
belongs. In my view, if Moore and Elkin chose to
replace an important analysis of labor relations
with this simulation, they chose the less valuable
course of action.
Labor history is conveyed here in eight
"lessons," which represent a useful way to
summarize labor history and which will un-
doubtedly be committed to memory by most
students who use the text. But perhaps the
lessons are too easy for the students to learn. The
Molly McGuires, the railroad strikes of the
1880s, Haymarket, the Pullman strike, sit-ins,
and Little Steel are lessons that are hard to
summarize in a line of boldface type. Those
events and others made unions more than
business agents trying to secure a good price for
labor and made management more than buyers
of another commodity, labor. Brevity here may
make it impossible for students to understand
the emotion of labor-management relations.
In the labor economics portion of the text,
each chapter typically begins with an institu-
tional discussion related to the chapter topic
and continues with a brief presentation of the
theory. These institutional and theoretical
portions of each chapter often stand unfortu-
nately far apart, with little to bridge them. The
chapter on wage determination, for example,
contains a good discussion of the wage struc-
tures and policies of firms that is completely
independent of the chapter's supply and de-
mand discussion. Similarly, coverage of the
unemployment rate is not related to the
discussion of market clearing.
One is continually left wondering how strong
the effects of the economic phenomena dis-
cussed in this text really are. We are told that the
discouraged-worker effect outweighs the
added-worker effect, but no empirical estimates
are given. We are told that a number of factors
have served to increase the labor-force partici-
pation of women, but we are given no data on
the relative magnitude of each effect. Dis-
turbingly, we are told that President Reagan's
economic policy is premised on work effort
increasing as taxes are cut, but the authors
provide none of the empirical estimates of the
actual elasticities of labor supply. Empirical
information can be presented in a straight-
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forward way even to undergraduates in an
introductory course. To fail to present it at all
suggests that labor economics has been stagnant
since the 1930s.
Moore and Elkin do have some very good
chapters in their text. "Wage-Price-
Employment Policies" and "Impact of Unions
on the Economy" are quite well written and are
described at the appropriate level of sophistica-
tion. The text is also well footnoted and the
reference lists are appropriate.
It may be that it is impossible to write a
concise introductory labor economics and labor
relations text that also covers the necesssary
material in enough depth to be meaningful. If
this is the case, an encyclopedic text or separate
labor relations and labor economics texts are in
order. The search for the perfect text does not





The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations
Policies ofAmerican Business in the 1940s. By
Howell John Harris. Madison, Wis.: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 1982. ix, 296 pp.
$21.50.
The Great Depression, New Deal, and rise of
the CIO confronted business leaders with a
threat to the cultural, political, and economic
dominance they had enjoyed during the 1920s.
The depression undermined public confidence
in business and its "natural" stewardship over
the economy; the New Deal, especially begin-
ning in 1935 with the Wagner Act, revealed the
declining political power of business and
indicated the ominous implications of that
decline; and the CIO effectively challenged the
claims of management to unilateral authority at
the workplace, while also attracting significant
public sympathy. For more than a decade,
business and labor battled in these arenas and
Howell John Harris argues that at the end of the
1940s, employers emerged victorious on all
grounds.
By 1950, the CIO has lost its lustre in the
public eye, Taft-Hartley symbolized the state's
role in labor relations, and industry had won at
the bargaining table most of the prerogatives it
considered essential to efficient production.
The terms of this victory suggest the change in
corporate industrial relations policy during this
period. Business leaders no longer sought to
repeal the Wagner Act or drive unions from
their factories. By 1950, they had learned to live
with the Wagner Act -at least as amended by
Taft-Hartley-and had recognized that "re-
sponsible" unions did not necessarily threaten
managerial control over work processes.
Harris argues that historians have viewed this
period too much from the perspective of unions
and workers and have overemphasized labor's
influence in shaping the pattern of industrial
relations that emerged in the late 1940s. Labor,
he insists, was a "reactive" force; business, the
"initiative" force. In a "pervasively capitalist
society," business, although not "hegemonic"
exercised sufficient power in the microeconomic
and political environment to determine in large
part both the parameters and perimeters of
union-management relations. Focusing on "the
contest for authority and control within in-
dustry," Harris concludes that union recognition
and collective bargaining were incorporated
into a "unitary" ideology of industrial relations:
decisions relating to production must be made
unilaterally by management.
Labor historians have for some time been
concerned with the importance of control as the
basic locus of industrial conflict. Harris,
however, offers insight into how employers
viewed the issue, and his perceptive analysis of
their changing policies reminds us that "mana-
gers are people, not calculating machines." This
simple maxim underlies one of the major
strengths of his book. To understand and
interpret management decisions and strategies,
a historian must examine how managers
perceived their situation, rather than assume
that they always accurately assessed their
alternatives and acted rationally. As other
people do, managers look at the world through
lenses shaped by their values and experience.
Harris helps us to understand the roots and logic
of industrial relations policies by explicating the
ideology and fears that underlay them.
Business leaders were an "embattled
threatened elite, their traditional dominance
challenged within their own firms and in the
large community." Most senior executives of
"center firms" - those that dominated Ameri-
can industry -were in agreement on their basic
objectives: to defend the American social and
economic order and to protect their authority at
the workplace. But they disagreed on tactics. By
the late 1940s, most executives had become
"practical conservatives." At the right wing of
this group sat those who were outright reac-
tionaries, who hoped to turn the clock back 20
years. Most, however, followed the lead of
General Motors, which had adopted a policy of
"armed truce" with the United Auto Workers.
Unions would be recognized as legitimate
institutions; collective bargaining was a zero-
sum process; and employers must bargain
aggressively and initiate their own demands at
